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Summary
This study analyses the procedures of radar system users in cases of intentional 
radar jamming and deception, with particular emphasis on safe navigation. Along 
with the procedure analysis, the study also deals with training methods of deck 
officers for jamming countermeasures to maintain certain accuracy of surveillance 
and safe navigation. The article also defines a decision tree – safe navigation which 
offers the radar operator the possibility of choosing “the course of action” based on 
the type of interference, assessed threat and the activities necessary to ensure safe 
navigation. Such research is of extreme importance for educating and training of 
maritime officers, especially deck officers, in thematic units relating to accuracy and 
reliability of the radar system exposed, in this case, to intentional interference. 
Sažetak
Ova studija analizira procedure radarskih korisnika u slučajevima namjernog zagušenja 
i obmane, s posebnim naglaskom na sigurnu plovidbe. Skupa s analizom procedure, 
studija se također bavi metodama koje časnici palube koriste i protumjerama da bi se 
održala određena preciznost i nadzor sigurne plovidbe. Članak također opisuje stablo 
odluka - sigurnu navigaciju koje nudi radarskom operatoru mogućnost odabira «tijeka 
djelovanja»  temeljenog na tipu interferencije, procijenjenoj opasnosti i aktivnostima 
potrebnima za sigurnu navigaciju. Takvo istraživanje je od iznimne važnosti zbog 
obrazovanja i obuke pomorskih časnika, posebno palubnih časnika, prigodom tematskih 
jedinica koje se odnose na točnost i pouzdanost izloženog radarskog sustava, a u ovom 
slučaju namjerna ometanja.
INTRODUCTION / Uvod
It is a well-known fact that interference with the radar system 
can endanger safe navigation. It is therefore essential to identify 
radar limitations in real usage conditions when exposed to 
intentional types of jamming. Intentional radar interferences 
are very rarely to hardly ever analysed in seafarer training, even 
though they exist and are widely applied. Previous research has 
shown that the awareness of intentional jamming on the radar 
display is insufficient which directly endangers safe navigation, 
thus adding value to this approach.
The situation in navigation has, in this sense, become even 
more complicated due to an increased number of pirate attacks 
and decreased prices of electronic  jammers. The development 
of contemporary radar systems is taking into account the 
resistance to intentional jamming, but efforts are nevertheless 
insufficient because there is a human factor at the end of the 
decision chain. Therefore, there is a problem of correct directing, 
accuracy and timely reactions of the deck crew members.
Namely, the question is how to avoid erroneous reactions 
which are very likely due to insufficient know-how as to 
overcoming momentary conditions of the radar system because 
of, for example, intentional interference, when the radar is 
functioning correctly but giving a false image of the actual 
surrounding. Research efforts and the knowledge of the effect 
of intentional radar interference on safe navigation must be 
directed at finding standard operative procedures which would 
help avoid erroneous activities (mostly due to a false image of 
the actual surrounding) and thus enable safe navigation. 
 Starting from the above stated, the study problem is defined 
as the level of training of systems operators for safe navigation 
under intentional (selective) jamming to which both the 
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Procedure undertaken
T1 + 1 min
Time
switch to a radar system operating in a different frequency band
T + 2 min






switch from automatic to manual vessel control
verify the current position of surrounding vessels with alternative radar systems (VTMIS, radar systems of surrounding ships)
increase the number of the crew members on the bridge of the ship
decrease the cruising speed to a safety speed
compare the established position with the position obtained from other electronic devices (AIS, GPS, ECDIS) (AIS, GPS, ECDIS)2
make the change of the navigation plan
continue navigation according to a new navigation plan, with increased surveillance and usage of other methods of 
determining the position
technical system and man are exposed to. The study subject is 
the level of knowledge and reaction of deck officers, i.e. operators 
of the marine radar system in interpreting “radar images” under 
jamming, for proper decision-making. Wrong decision can 
lead to far-reaching consequences which could result in ship 
collision, sinking, grounding, etc. The study object is an operative 
procedure of the radar system operator (deck officer) and the 
protocol by which the latter has to operate while identifying 
intentional (selective) jamming , all for the purpose of ensuring 
safe navigation. The correct course of action according to the 
operative procedure and protocol should always answer to two 
questions: 
1. Is there intentional (selective) jamming ? and 
2. If there is, how and what actions should be taken to 
ensure safe navigation?
Unlike unintentional interference impacts, the impact of 
intentional (selective) jamming on the correct and reliable 
performance of the radar system is insufficiently researched 
(bibliographic units detailing intentional jamming are very few), 
so the purpose of the study was to broaden the knowledge of 
the problem and to improve the identification of jamming and 
ensure, through sufficient training, increased safe navigation. 
The study’s hypothesis is that an improved and more precise 
processing of received information of the navigational radar 
system under intentional (selective) jamming and a high quality 
training of deck officers can enable better navigational safety 
under contemporary threats posed by intentional jamming.
The first part of the study focuses attention on defining the 
procedure methodology under  radar jamming, whereas the 
second part suggests ways of enabling deck officers to identify 
and counteract  the impact of intentional jamming.
1. DECK OFFICER’S PROCEDURES IN THE CASE 
OF INTENTIONAL JAMMING / Postupci palubnog 
časnika u slučaju namjernog ometanja
Today, safe navigation is increasingly reliant upon the radar 
system (e.g. ARPA radar) in various navigation areas and in 
determining the position of the navigating vessel. It is therefore 
necessary to define procedures in case of intentional jamming.
Procedures suggested in case of identification and existence 




•	 change in navigation plan and
•	 increased surveillance.
The necessary procedures are: 
•	 usage of the alternative radar system, or  new operating 
frequency of the radar
•	 determining the current vessel position with other 
electronic devices
•	 radio contact with nearby vessels and port authorities 
and reporting on the current state.
In accordance with the above stated, the following decisions 
are possible:
a. continue navigation,
b. continue navigation with increased surveillance,
c. reroute and
d. stop navigation.
Besides the above stated, it is also necessary to make a 
record of the incident , which will later be used  for the analysis 
of the procedures undertaken. In accordance with the author’s 
experience and research of intentional jamming and the fact 
that thus far literature has not methodologically detailed the 
documentation of such events, it is suggested the notes contain 
the following elements
•	  Chronology of events, as shown in Table 1. (research 
has shown that the most dominant shadow sector is 
in the direction connecting the radar jammer and the 
jammed radar).
•	 Description of the area where the jamming  occurred 
- determine the jamming direction based on the most 
dominant shadow sector of the radar screen.
     c.     A list of engaged devices and procedures undertaken 
to prevent intentional interference:
•	 which other devices were used and what the operating 
radar frequency was used
•	 what information about the situation in the 
environment of the existing vessels and navigation 
Table 1. Chronology of incident
Tablica 1. Kronologija nezgode
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features  was obtained from AIS subsystem,
•	 ECDIS comparison of the current position with the 
situation on the map
•	 The results of procedures undertaken which reduced 
the effect of intentional jamming and protected safe 
navigation.
Records are made by the deck officer on call and approved 
by the ship commander. As a contribution to the study, Table 
1 suggests procedures for radar system operators in cases of 
intentional jamming. The procedure is shown in Figure 1. and is 
divided into two units: technical and tactical. 
Figure 1. shows procedures of the radar system operator in 
case of intentional jamming . The procedure is divided into two 
units: technical and tactical procedures. 
Considering how the defined sub processes have not yet 
been detailed in the literature available, Table 2. offers the 
possibility of better understanding of the jamming process as 
well as procedures suggested. 
The most important step is assessing and determining the 
degree of  threat because this creates prerequisites for a high 
quality choice of tactical and technical procedures. 
Tactical measures suggest rerouting (changing navigation 
Figure 1. Procedures of the radar system operator in case of intentional jamming 4
Slika 1. Postupci operatora radarskog sustava u slučaju namjernog ometanja 4
plans) in a way that would avoid running aground or colliding 
with the objects in the navigating aquatorium. 
Technical measures ensure the choice of alternative 
technical devices, thus ensuring an accurate position and vessel 
route.
Based on  previously mentioned, upon completion of 
procedures in case of intentional jamming, and taking into 
account the applied technical and tactical procedures, the 
following data is present: 
•	 chronology of incident during procedures undertaken
•	 the area where the jamming occurred
•	 engaged devices and procedures undertaken
•	 results of the procedures undertaken to reduce 
jamming
Mentioned data are entered into the database and can 
serve to develop simulation models in the deck officer training 
process.
It is also noticed that there are seven sub-processes, 
described in Table 2., which are conducted during  intentional 
jamming.
 Every sub-procedure is actually a sum of actions that is 
NAME OF SUBPROCESS DESCRIPTION OF THE SUBPROCESS
Detection of jamming After the start of jamming, the officer identifies the situation on the 
radar screen which is not in accordance with the expected one. 
Identification of jamming Considering the situation, he tries to diagnose jamming elements: type, area where it is originating from, intensity and severity of the impact on data
Normal continuation of navigation despite jamming Unless impact on the data is dominant, navigation proceeds 
with increased caution.
Technical procedures to reduce the impact of amming
Tactical procedures to reduce the impact of jamming
Continue navigation after exiting the area affected by 
jamming
Records
Undertake action that involves using and connecting system circuits 
to reduce the impact of jamming.
Undertake action and procedures which imply the use of tactical procedures 
to reduce the impact of jamming (operating on other radar systems, use of 
data obtained from other electronic devices, rerouting the vessel and etc.)
Continue navigation after the end of jamming.
Make a record of the undertaken and executed activities and procedures.
Table 2. Sub-processes in case of jamming 4
Tablica 2. Podpostupak u slučaju ometanja 4
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Figure 2. Decision tree – safe navigation 4
Slika 2. Stablo odluke - sigurna navigacija 4
71“Naše more” 61(3-4)/2014., pp. 67-76
directly carried out by the deck officer. 
The decision tree for protecting safe navigation is shown in 
Figure 2. 
The decision three shown in Figure 2. whose aim is to enable 
safe navigation, is the direct result of the knowledge gained and 
procedures suggested in the previous section of the study and 
represents an original contribution to safe navigation.
The decision tree is in the shape of an algorithm and offers 
the radar operator the possibility of deciding on “a decision 
path”,depending on the type of jamming, threat assessment 
and activities necessary to undertake for safe navigation.
The choice of the decision path, depending on the 
information collected, is divided into two units:
a. when the assessed threat of intentional interference 
can be reduced to an acceptable level and is not critical for 
safe navigation ( continuation of navigation with increased 
surveillance) and
b. when the assessed threat is unacceptable and critical for 
safe navigation ( re-routing or stopping navigation).
The suggested and standard operative procedures 
shown enable effective protection of safe navigation in cases 
of intentional jamming with radar systems. They are to be 
elaborated in detail for each case: vessel, platform, monitoring 
station and etc.
 
Along with the defined actions and standard operative 
procedures, it is also necessary to conduct adequate deck 
officer training for confronting intentional jamming through the 
educational system at Maritime colleges. This type of training 
will be outlined in the following unit.
2. DECK OFFICER TRAINING TO COUNTER 
INTENTIONAL JAMMING / Obuka palubnog 
časnika da se suoči s namjernim ometanjem
Deck officer training to counter international jamming should 
be carried out through the education process and a suitable 
training. The curriculum and syllabus of such training should 
combine various explanations of the radar image.
Radar image is different from the natural panoramic image 
of the human eye for the following reasons:
•	 different wavelength of light and radar waves,
•	 reflections of individual objects are neither in size nor 
shape proportional to natural ones,
•	 depending on the direction and distance separation, 
close objects merge,  
•	 existence of radar shadows,
•	 existence of false reflections and interferences,
•	 existence of blind sectors and etc.
2.1. IMPACT OF INTENTIONAL JAMMING ON THE 
RADAR SCREEN / Utjecaj namjernog ometanja na 
radarskom zaslonu
Due to the existing differences in radar images it is necessary 
to show the trainees, through simulator training, the various 
images on the radar screen when exposed to different 
interferences. Those impacts can be:
•	 Object distortion – it is reflected in relatively enlarged 
dimensions in relation to real ones. Directional object 
distortion is caused by horizontal beam width and is 
reflected in angular object enlargement. Longitudinal 
object distortion is caused by the impulse width while 
radar shadows represent dark places which appear 
due to the shape of obstacles, their position and the 
inability of EM waves to reflect against geometrically 
occluded areas.
•	  False and interfering reflections – these are the 
reflections whose position on the radar display does 
not correspond to the real one, giving erroneous 
(false) information on objects. The cause of this is 
mostly multiple reflections, reflections due to side 
lobes, reflections against parts of its ship, secondary 
reflections and etc.
•	 Intentional interference - detailed in the author’s PhD 
thesis.
During the training process it is of pivotal importance to 
approach interpretation of the radar image in cold waters in 
high latitudes due to sub - refraction and possible icebergs 
whose smooth and bent surface can be detected from a 
relatively small range.
When studying these radar reflections it is necessary to 
point out the fact that they differ according to:






The main characteristics of the reflection based on the 
object features are: 
for ground objects:
•	 objects appear in expected positions, according to its 
location on the map,
•	 reflections do not have movements of their own,
•	 reciprocal positions of these reflections do not change,
•	 reflections are most often big and “dense”
for vessels:
•	 reflections are not expected according to the map,
•	 they have their own movements,
•	 they fluctuate, but do not disappear (they appear 
whenever a EM wave passes through) 
•	 they are narrow (in relation to the radial line)
•	 they appear at a medium range (which depends on the 
size of the vessel, material and route),
for boats, buoys and other small objects:
•	 they appear at small ranges,
•	 their fluctuation is prominent, with disappearances in 
certain EM beam passages in wavy sea)
•	 reflections are stronger than individual reflection (dot) 
of interferences.
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Figure 3. Diagram shows dependency of the radar range on the 
reflective surface of the target 4
Slika 3. Dijagram prikazuje ovisnost radarskog dometa na 
površinu koja reflektira cilja br. 4
The visual aspect is extremely important in the learning 
process of beginners. It is therefore essential to use electronic 
methods to show radar images which can identify interferences.
In the following pages we will show what interferences 
look like on the Konsberg Maritime K-Bridge ARPA radar screen. 
(Figure 3. a,b,c,d)
Based on the ARPA radar features and possible errors in its 
correct functioning, seafearer training must emphasise that 
mistakes can also be triggered by intentional (selective) jamming 
using certain jamming modes. It is of pivotal importance to 
point out that there are two key areas in which intentional 
3. a. Radar display without the impact of intentional 
interferences 9
3. a. Radarski zaslon bez utjecaja namjernih interferencija 9
3. b. Radar receiver in saturation in the 160⁰ sector 4
3. b. Radarski prijamnik u zasićenju kod 160⁰ sektor 4
3. c. Noise generated for sector 2100 4
3. c. Buka koja je proizvedena za sektor 2100 4
3. d. Amplitude modulated interference 4
3. d. Interferencija 4  prilagođene amplitude
(selective) jamming can manifest iteself in ARPA radars:
a) while monitoring objects and danger assessment and
b) exchange of navigating vessels and imitating them  by 
emitting false alarms, imitating channels and narrow passages 
and imitating search and rescue actions
Regarding the navigation safety, such jamming can often be 
applied in the presence of high speed vessels and in locations 
of dense traffic, when, for example, the radar operator fails to 
interpret the minimum bypassing distance and navigation 
time to the minimal bypassing distance correctly, i.e. leading 
to interruption of object monitoring because it has simply 
vanished from the screen because the echo of one of the 
navigating vessels  was artificially increased in relation to the 
other so the computer continued to monitor the vessel with the 
stronger echo rather than the one with the higher priority. 
Table 3 shows some of the jamming modes and their 
manifestations on the ARPA radar. The table unites error 
manifestations in ARPA radars and the effect such jamming can 
have on navigation safety. 
In accordance with Table 3, the following will show 
dependency between radar ranges in relation to reflective 
surface of the target for the given detection coefficient. Table 
3 shows dependency of the radar range on the radar reflective 
surface (σ).
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Correspondingly, we are analyzing different object 
detection (detection targets) at sea and their possible masking 
in noise. Table 4 shows examples of parameters of civil radars 
used in navigation.
On the basis of Table 4, calculations are made for  detection 
coefficients of known detection threshold (SNRmin, Signal-to-
Noise Ratio at which reliable detection occurs) from 12, 5 dB 
for specific types of radars (A-E) and radar range in relation to 
specific types of navigating vessels (Table 5) representative by 
the size of radar reflective surface. 
In accordance with the stated in Table 5, various diagrams 
for those types of radar have been made.
Figure 4 clearly shows how radar range increases with 
the increase of radar power i.e. the fishing vessel of the radar 
reflective surface 6 m2 is at the end of radar visibily whose 
power is Pt=2,2 kW. Also noticeable is that radars stronger than 
Table 3. The effect and manifestation of jamming modes in ARPA radars 4
Tablica 3. Efekt i manifestacija načina ometanja kod ARPA radara 4
Jamming modes Jamming effect Manifestation on the ARPA radar
SPOT-NOISE JAMMING - bandwidth noise 
jamming
Inability to detect the aim (high noise 
density within the  reciever bandwidth)
Reflection disappearance (island and 





SCAN FREQUENCY JAMMING – 
generating gate speed error
RGWO- Range Gate Walk-Off 
DELTA JAMMING 
AGC JAMMING - 
AGC(Automatic Gain Control) 
BARAGE NOISE
Generating false objects
Inhibits object monitoring  i.e. 
determining aim coordinates
Generating gate speed error 
(false Doppler aims)
Range time gate walk off  from the aim
Error in tracking the angle
Error in tracking the angle
Angle error
Masking the expected reciever radar 
signal
Appearance of objects on unexpected 
locations
Detecting objects with false coordinates, 
incorrect bypass course calculations
Appearance of moving objects with 
false speeds
Detecting objects with false 
coordinates and speeds
Light fans on the radar screen that 
cover object and land refletions – 
inability to detect objects
Example A B C D E
R (NMi) - radar range
Pt (kW) - radar power
θH (º) – bandwidth horizontally
θV (º) – bandwidth vertically
Gt (dB) – antenna gain
Fn (dB) – noise factor
Bn (MHz) -  width of the frequency 
 noise band
Fr (dB) – radar factor
16 48 96 120 120
2.2 4 12 25 50
6.2 2.4 1.8 1.23 0.95
25 27 25 20 20
21 25 26 29 30
10 6 6 6 6
7 3 3 3 3
201 219 227 235 241
Figure 4. Diagram showing dependance of radar range on the reflective surface of the target for different radars 4
Slika 4. Dijagram koji pokazuje ovisnost radarskog dometa o površini cilja koji reflektira  za različite radare 4
Table 4. Typical examples of civil radar parameters for  
navigational purposes in X-range (Gallman P.) 11
Tablica 4. Tipični primjerci parametara civilnog radara za 
navigacione svrhe kod X-dometa (Gallman P.) 11
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Title 






lecture performance Report on lectures and exercises held 
Training content:  
Unit:
The starting point of the training: STCW 78/95 Convention
Training components:
•	 Description of radar systems used on SOLAS vessels 
•	 Familiarization with the problem of electronic jamming with radar system and aspects of electornic 
countermeasures applicable on SOLAS vessels
•	 Familiarization with tactical and technical procedures applicable during intentional jamming with the 
radar system 
•	 Assessment and risk analysis in cases of intentional jamming
•	 Monitoring, surveillance and navigation in cases of intentional jamming
•	 Documentation and files management 
•	 Reporting in cases of intentional jamming
Purpose:
•	 Familiarize students with the process and methodology of procedures in cases of intentional jamming. 
Competencies and understanding:
•	 Understanding and identifying intentional radar jamming 
•	 Navigational training during intentional jamming
Knowledge and skills:
•	 Identifying intentional radar jamming
•	 Quality equipment for executing work assignments
Types of training:
•	 lectures
•	 work on the simulator
Student 
responsabilites
Regular attendance at lectures, practical training and exercises on the navigation simulator
Outcomes
•	 Explain and apply the knowledge on radar system of SOLAS vessels
•	 Explain and define the impact of intentional jamming to safe navigation  
•	 Explain and use the knowledge of intentional electronic jamming
•	 Explain and use technical procedures to protect against jamming
•	 Explain and use tactical procedures to protect against jamming
•	 Explain and apply ways of reporting in cases of jamming
•	 Apply the acquired knowledge to maintaining safe navigation under intentional jamming
Table 5. Calculations of the detection coefficient and range for specific types of radar and navigating vessels 4
Tablica 5. Kalkulacije koeficijenta praćenja i dometa za specifične tipove radara i brodove koji plove 4
Pt
5 (kW)=2,2 Pt (kW)=4 Pt(kW)=12 Pt (kW)=25 Pt (kW)=50
kdet (dB) -1.0 3.51 5.51 7.51 9.01
Rfsp
6(NM)
(Fishing vessel σ ~ 6m2) 
Rfsp (NM)
(Fishing vessel σ ~ 1000 m2) 
1.2 4.62 8.22 11.22 13.45
4.46 17.41 30.97 41.68 50.58
Rfsp (NM)
(Bulk carrier σ ~ 5.000 m2)
6.66 26.00 46.23 63.09 75.50
Rfsp (NM)
(Warship σ ~ 50.000 m2) 
11.85 46.23 82.22 112.20 134.28
Rfsp (NM)
(Tanker σ ~ 1.000.000 m2) 
25.00 97.94 174.18 237.68 284.44
Tablica 6. Syllabus of the necessary training 
Tablica 6. Silabus potrebne obuke
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Evaluation of the acquired knowledge and skills
NOTE: The final grade will be based on  the success achieved 
in all marking elements listed. All elements have to be marked 
























Forms for recording student attendance
The professor’s signature
Obligatory for the professor’s signature :
1. achieving a sufficient percentage of 
attendance at exercises,
2. achieving a sufficient percentage of 
attendance at lectures.
2,2 KW will detect the target of the stated reflective size.
However, if, with such conditions, we generate jamming 
whose manifestations on the ARPA radar  are defined in Table 
3.  it is obvious that this will inevitably further threaten range, 
visibility, and accuracy of recieved data directly linked to the 
type of jamming, sector where it originated from and the 
jammer power. Experience (of the author while working with 
operative radar jammers) has proven that the increase of radar 
power (by increasing radar range) in cases of jammer- responder 
(jammer analyses and responds to every inward impuls) only 
achieves the opposite effect i.e. radar reciever is jammed by a 
stroner jamming signal. 
Correspondingly, the following part recommends a training 
syllabus for deck officers in cases of intentional jamming for the 
purposes of taking  necessary actions in cases of intentional 
radar jamming. 
2.2. SYLLABUS OF THE NECESSARY TRAINING / 
Silabus potrebne obuke
Table 3. shows the outline of the curriculum and syllabus of a 
sailor in charge of the watch on the ship bridge.
The syllabus is the result of years of work and research 
conducted in the area of radar jamming, lectures  of radar 
system  operators  in cases of intentional jamming  as well as 
lectures held at Maritime colleges. Research has practically 
shown that radar system operators have numerous times failed 
to recognize radar jamming and have accordingly not been able 
Title 






lecture performance Report on lectures and exercises held 
Training content:  
Unit:
The starting point of the training: STCW 78/95 Convention
Training components:
•	 Description of radar systems used on SOLAS vessels 
•	 Familiarization with the problem of electronic jamming with radar system and aspects of electornic 
countermeasures applicable on SOLAS vessels
•	 Familiarization with tactical and technical procedures applicable during intentional jamming with the 
radar system 
•	 Assessment and risk analysis in cases of intentional jamming
•	 Monitoring, surveillance and navigation in cases of intentional jamming
•	 Documentation and files management 
•	 Reporting in cases of intentional jamming
Purpose:
•	 Familiarize students with the process and methodology of procedures in cases of intentional jamming. 
Competencies and understanding:
•	 Understanding and identifying intentional radar jamming 
•	 Navigational training during intentional jamming
Knowledge and skills:
•	 Identifying intentional radar jamming
•	 Quality equipment for executing work assignments
Types of training:
•	 lectures
•	 work on the simulator
Student 
responsabilites
Regular attendance at lectures, practical training and exercises on the navigation simulator
Outcomes
•	 Explain and apply the knowledge on radar system of SOLAS vessels
•	 Explain and define the impact of intentional jamming to safe navigation  
•	 Explain and use the knowledge of intentional electronic jamming
•	 Explain and use technical procedures to protect against jamming
•	 Explain and use tactical procedures to protect against jamming
•	 Explain and apply ways of reporting in cases of jamming
•	 Apply the acquired knowledge to maintaining safe navigation under intentional jamming
to take necessary measures. 
The number of lectures and exercises can vary depending 
on the type of simulator and radar device used for the training. 
If necessary,  it is suggested to make  the adjustment for the 
training  group in question. 
CONCLUSION / Zaključak
The results of this study are directy applicable in everyday 
marine practice. They can directy affect an increased safe 
navigation  because the very application of these results 
reduces the danger of intentional jamming.
This can be achieved through:
•	 knowing the models and the corresponding 
procedures as described in Chapter 1., 
•	 identifying jamming, as detailed in Chapter 2.1. i.e.
•	 an appropriate deck officer training in countering 
intentional jamming, as described in Chapter 2.2.
Worth noting is the contribution to a broader scientific 
knowledge of the impact of intentional jamming to safe 
navigation. as a result of years of work on the issue of radar 
system jamming in a series of articles dealing with radar system 
jamming 2, 4, 10, 12, 13, 14.
All of the stated has special significance in educating and 
training marine officers, deck officers, especially in thematic 
units relating to accuracy and reliability of the radar system 
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exposed, in this case, to intentional jamming. Insufficient 
research of the impact of intentional jamming  on the correct 
performance of the radar can endanger safe navigation. As 
mentioned previously, intentional jamming and research 
into radar system jamming has mainly been conducted in the 
military structure domain which has made research results 
unavailable to the broader scientific study and consequently 
caused insufficient training of  deck officers on  SOLAS vessels.. 
It is therefore suggested to continue with permanent 
research and training in identifying radar limitations in real 
usage conditions when the radar is exposed to various types 
of jamming. Also suggested is to keep up to date with the 
development of radars used on vessels and of systems for 
intentional jamming and changing and adjusting of the 
necessary educating and training.  
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